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Interest and identity in network formation:  




Abstract: In this paper, we use an unusually rich data set from Ghana to explore the 
endogenous formation of information network linkages among farmers. We 
propose and test a new measure of social distance that accommodates possible 
asymmetries in social distance. Using this improved measure, we show that 
social distance plays a major role in shaping network structure, but that other 
factors related to the inherent costs and benefits of linkage matter significantly 
as well. Network interlinkages appear relatively modest.  We are also able to 
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1. Introduction 
The idea that social interactions influence individual decisions by means other than the 
impersonal play of the market has made its way into economics, typically through the 
discussion of how membership in some group (through peer or neighborhood effects, 
moral norms and the like) affects individual decision (see, for example, the discussion in 
Durlauf (1999) or Manski (2000)). 
Since the intersection of such affiliations defines one’s identity (Breiger, 1990) 
this is an explanation that, under a different light, gained relevance in the economics 
literature with the work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000). The concept of social distance 
(Akerlof, 1997) and the tendency to deal with those who are similar to us (homophily) 
ties both approaches, by feeding back into how groups are formed and maintained. 
Most of the extant literature nonetheless takes social interactions as exogenous. 
As Arrow (2000) puts it, in perhaps the clearest defense of such position, “[t]he concept 
of measuring social interactions may be a snare and a delusion. Instead of thinking of 
more and less, it may be more fruitful to think of the existing social relations as a 
preexisting network into which new parts of the economy (…) have to be fitted”. Such an 
approach, however, moves from an under-socialized perspective of human agency that so 
many criticize in economics, to an over-socialized one (Granovetter, 1985) that 
economists typically associate with other social sciences. The nonrandomness of 
individuals’ group memberships makes inference problematic.
1 
This reaction is not only inconsistent with the core economic principle that people 
respond to material self-interest, albeit not to material self-interest exclusively, it is also 
                                                 
1 Manski (1993) emphasizes three problems in particular: the reflection problem, the problem of omitted 
variables, and the endogenous nature of social networks. This paper focuses on the latter problem. 
   3
contradicted by much of the literature in the other social sciences. Not only can group-
level ascription be a choice motivated by material interest,
2 as in the religious conversion 
of the Orma, in Kenya, studied by Ensminger (1997), or changes in ethnic identity among 
the Fur in Darfur, Western Sudan, analyzed by Haaland (1969), but, more generally, the 
establishment of personal links between people often follow an implicit cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 For example, in analyzing the process of agricultural change in Ghana, Nigeria, 
Kenya and Zambia, Berry (1993) shows that investment in social relations was essential 
to gain (and maintain) access to productive resources: Because “In most African 
societies, social identity and status may be achieved as well as ascribed” and “partly 
because of the continued importance of social networks as channels of access to the 
means of production, many farmers invested part of their income in maintaining or 
advancing their position within established networks and/or gaining entry into new ones. 
As a result, membership and status in social networks have influenced the organization of 
agricultural production, the level of agricultural output and sales, and the structure of 
social relations within rural communities” (pp 159-160, emphasis added).  
In recounting the 19th century history of the Lake Turkana region, Kenya, 
Sobania (1991) similarly describes how different relationships formed in response to a 
clear cost-benefit analysis of each social interaction, in particular through the potential 
                                                 
2 The ascription to race underlied South Africa’s apartheid system. The codification of such ascription is 
not always clear.  Consider, for example, the passage from the official gazette once read on stage by Pieter-
Dirk Uys, a South African comedian, “In terms of the Population Registration Act and in answer to a 
question from the Member of Parliament from Houghton, Mrs. Helen Suzman, five hundred and eighteen 
Coloreds were reclassified as Whites, fourteen Whites became Colored, seven Chinese became White, two 
Whites became Chinese, three Malays became Whites, one White became an Indian, fifty Indians became 
Colored, fifty seven Coloreds became Indian, seventeen Indians became Malay, four Coloreds became 
Chinese …” (New Yorker, May 10, 2004, p.75). Note that the reclassification is mainly into White, that is, 
in direction to the privileged position in South African society during the apartheid era.     4
role such relations played as part of a safety net to be mobilized in times of stress: “the 
gift of a head of stock was not an impulsive action but was rather both given and received 
as a compliment calculated to extend and individual’s sphere of supportive relationships. 
Although unable to garner support in political matters or settlement of disputes from 
those friends who lived in neighboring societies, as would be the case with partners from 
within his own society, a herdsman’s inter-societal partnerships greatly enlarged his 
knowledge of the region and his options in the economic sphere … when confronted with 
the risks and perils brought on by natural or men made disasters, such as droughts, 
disease and raids, the herdsmen could turn to his bond partners in addition to his kin and 
affines. When the difficulties of his intra-society coincided with his own, the individual 
who had invested in partnerships beyond the bounds of his own society continued to have 
options of assistance open to him.” (p. 135-136). 
The common thread of these and many other anthropological, historical and 
sociological accounts is the focus on a set of links between agents (a social network) that 
are purposefully chosen by the individuals involved . As Wellman and Berkowitz (1988a) 
put it, “social networks are the strings that simultaneously constrain our freedom and 
provide us with opportunities to take initiatives” (p. xii). The appeal of explicitly 
incorporating the role of human agency in the design and evolution of observable 
networks of human relations is that, again quoting Wellman and Berkowitz “[i]t 
immediately directs analysts to look at linked social relations, and frees them from 
thinking of social systems as collections of individuals, two-person dyads, bounded 
groups or simple categories” (idem, 1988b, p.4).    5
A small but growing empirical literature in development economics
3 addresses 
this issue of endogenous network formation relying heavily on the concept of social 
distance (Akerlof, 1997) and the tendency people have to deal more with those who are 
similar to us (homophily), rather than those who are different from us (heterophily). For 
example, Dercon and deWeerdt (2002) test for risk-insurance using data on the complete 
set of personal networks in a Tanzanian village while deWeerdt (forthcoming) explains 
the process by which these networks form. In a similar spirit, Conley and Udry (2002) 
study the process of learning about fertilizer application in Ghana while Udry and Conley 
(forthcoming), address the question of the formation of the networks that shape the access 
to information, credit, land and labor in that same region.
4  
This paper breaks from the literature in the way that we conceptualize social 
distance.  In the economics literature to date, distance has been measured simply as a 
Euclidean norm to capture the magnitude of differences in any of several observable 
characteristics between network partners, with the most commonly used characteristic 
being physical location.  Geographic distance has thus been the primary measure used.   
We employ a simple modification that allows for the possibility that the direction (or 
sign) of these differences also matters, that one’s ordinal position with respect to a 
potential network partner can affect culturally defined norms of behavior and one’s 
subjective evaluation of the benefits of establishing or maintaining a social link.  
                                                 
3 With this choice, we miss the theoretical literature on models of network formation (see Jackson 
(forthcoming) for a review) and the (mostly US-based) literature on neighborhood effects, especially upon 
education outcomes (see Akerlof and Kranton (2003) for a review). Although both of those literatures 
provide some insights into this problem, space limitations prevent us from addressing them. 
4 To this list, one could add Fafchamps and Lund (2003), that study risk-sharing networks in the Philippines 
and Behrman, Kohler and Watkins (2001), that analyze the diffusion of family planning and AIDS worries 
in Kenya. Although with similar objectives, their approach to the endogenous nature of such networks 
makes no use of the concept of social distance and, as such, is quite apart from the discussion in this paper.   6
In the next section, we briefly discuss the data we use.  These publicly available 
data were collected in the Eastern Region of Ghana by Chris Udry and Markus Goldstein 
and have been used by them and their collaborators in several important recent papers on 
the role social networks play in rural Africa. Section 3 then presents our econometric 
results, which support three major conclusions. First, both material interest and 
sociocultural identity help explain individuals’ decision to contact an acquaintance to 
obtain information relevant for the solution of specific agricultural production or 
marketing problems. Second, we test the measure of social distance proposed in Section 2 
against the standard, Euclidean norm approach and find that the former outperforms the 
latter in explaining three of the four networks we study and is statistically equivalent in 
the fourth. Third, we find that frequency of contact has an inverted-U effect on the 
probability of contacting someone for information, giving some support to the “strength 
of weak ties hypothesis” suggested by Granovetter (1973). 
 
2. Data 
We use data on economic activities and social interactions between people living in four 
villages in southeastern Ghana. The publicly available data
5 are discussed at length in 
Goldstein and Udry (1999).  
This region has a long tradition of commercial agriculture and, in the early 1990s, 
initiated a process of conversion from cassava and maize production, directed towards 
domestic urban consumer markets, into pineapple production, directed to European 
export markets. The transition in crops and markets brought with it new inputs (primarily, 
                                                 
5 The data, and the survey instruments, are available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~cru2/ghanadata.html.   7
inorganic fertilizers) and a process of differentiation between those farmers who adopted 
the new crop (mainly, male and wealthier farmers) and those who did not.  
Udry and Conley (forthcoming, p.3) summarize this dynamic by saying that 
“economic development in this region is being shaped by the networks of information, 
capital and influence that permeate these communities.” They are able to quantify the 
importance of social networks – for example, in learning about fertilizer application 
(Conley and Udry (2002) – because the survey collected very detailed data on 
respondents’ patterns of personal interaction.  We use those data to study endogenous 
network formation among these Ghanaian farmers. 
Social networks information was collected in two ways. First, respondents were 
asked to identify those with whom they had significant discussions on agricultural 
matters. Second, respondents were matched with seven individuals randomly chosen   
from the sample
6 and asked about the possibility of addressing them when faced with 
some specific problem, through the following questions: 
“Could you go to ___ if you had a problem with unhealthy crops?” 
“Could you go to ___ for advice about when to apply a new kind of fertilizer?” 
“Could you go to ___ if you wanted to discuss changing your method of 
planting?” 
“Could you go to ___ if you wanted to find a buyer for any of your crops?” 
We use the answers to these questions to indicate the possibility of a link between 
the two individuals, i.e., the answers reflect the potential network of each respondent, not 
                                                 
6 The respondents were also non-randomly matched with three individuals considered to be focal in their 
village (a farmer in the survey and two other persons not previously surveyed).  We do not use data on 
those three prospective matches, both due to its non-random nature and the fact that information is 
generally not available on most of the focal individuals, making the sort of analysis we perform impossible.      8
the actual one. Given that we care about the determinants of these networks (and not their 
actual benefits), this does not seem to be a limitation
7. There were three possible answers, 
“yes”, “no” and “yes, but he wouldn’t know”, although the last choice was never 
reported. Table 1 presents the answers to these questions, disaggregated by whether or 
not the respondent knows his or her match. 
[TABLE 1 ] 
Three key facts emerge from this Table.  First, not everyone knows everyone else, 
even in a small, rural village setting.  This calls into question the widespread practice of 
using common village membership as a proxy for a social connection. Second, not 
knowing the matched individual effectively prevents respondents from addressing the 
matched individual in order to gain access to information.  Pre-existing social ties are 
plainly a necessary condition to obtaining information through informal channels.  Third, 
knowing someone does not mean that one can or would go to them to ask for 
information.  Combining the second and third points, prior knowledge of someone is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition to approach them for information.  Thus the 
shape of the network through which rural Ghanaian farmers obtain information is plainly 
social yet determined by factors other than just prior association.   
                                                 
7 The other source of information on network structure in this data set, the question on with whom did the 
respondents’ had significant discussions on agricultural matters, does not provide a better guide, for two 
reasons.  First, not all the listed individuals were part of the sample, hence no information on their identity 
is available. Second, the period when each of the listed individuals was contacted is not known (making 
impossible the estimation of differences in characteristics that change over time, such as experience or 
wealth). One other possibility could be to use the answers to the question “Have you ever gone to X  for 
advice about your farm?”, where X is one of the random matches. This possibility poses similar problems 
to the one just described, to which one may add that a negative answer may just indicate that there were 
some other source of information that the respondent valued more and on which we may not have any 
information (including its existence). This may account for the small number of positive answers (around 
10% of the total number of matches), which adds the additional problem that with such an imbalance in the 
structure of the dependent variable, the estimates of the parameters of a probit model, like the ones that will 
be estimated, become quite unreliable.   9
In order to explain the decisions summarized in Table 1, we use data on variables 
such as clan membership, gender, age, formal education, non-land wealth,
8 experience 
with different crops,
9 sources of income other than farm production (non-farm wage or 
salaried employment and self-employment) and occupation. We take these variables as 
indicators of the costs and benefits of establishing the information link, both as attributes 
of the respondent and as measures of distance between the respondent and the match. 
In the literature on social distance, the Euclidean norm appears to be the only 
measure used. Implicitly, its use imposes symmetry on the effect of differences between 
the two parties to a link. For example, taking wealth as the relevant dimension, the use of 
Euclidean distance assumes that wealth ordering is irrelevant to the incentives to establish 
a link, that a rich farmer faces the same costs and benefits of linking to a poor farmer as 
the same poor farmer does to the same richer man.  
In order to avoid such an unnecessarily restrictive assumption, we measure social 
distance as a simple modification of the Euclidean norm, through the definition of a pair 
of indicator variables. Let X be any of the non-categorical variables (age, wealth, 
agricultural experience, non-agricultural sources of income) on which information is 
available.  We then measure the distance between the respondent i and the match j by the 
following two variables: 
                                                 
8 Non-land wealth was estimated as the sum of the values of the following assets: foreign currency, cash in 
bank accounts, bonds, susu and esusu, livestock, crops, seeds, chemicals and farm equipment. The 
definition of individual wealth is made difficult by the number of missing answers in the value of some 
assets, specifically jewelry (244 missing answers), cash on hand (66) and clothes (45), even when we use 
the inventory of assets from round 1, when all respondents were interviewed. Non-farm equipment was 
enumerated only in rounds 9 and 15, while stocks for trade were only captured in round 2, and with a high 
number of missing values (360).  We therefore omit these latter categories of assets from the non-land 
wealth estimates. 
9 In the survey, an important number of respondents indicated their experience with some crops as “more 
than x years”. We approximated such information by taking their experience with such crop to be “x 
years”.   10
I(Xi – Xj< 0) * |Xi – Xj| +I(Xi – Xj ≥ 0) * |Xi – Xj|           (1) 
where I(●) is an indicator function taking value one if true, zero otherwise.  Clearly, one of 
the two indicator variables in the distance definition (1) equals zero. 
For the categorical variables (gender, occupation, migrant status), distance is 
defined by a set of dummy variables that consider the several possible characterizations 
of the match. Hence, for clan, we define only the variable “share_clan” (that takes the 
value 1 if both respondent and match belong to the same clan) but a complete 
characterization of the effect of gender requires the definition of the following four 
variables: 
mm = {1 if i = male and j = male; 0 otherwise} 
ff    = {1 if i = female and j = female; 0 otherwise} 
mf  = {1 if i = male and j =female; 0 otherwise} 
fm  = {1 if i = female and j =male; 0 otherwise}. 
We explore the effects of differences in formal education by defining a dummy 
variable designated “literacy” that accounts for the case when i is illiterate and j is 
literate.
10 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the set of explanatory variables. 
[TABLE 2] 
As in the extant literature, we interpret our measures of social distance (that is, 
differences in gender, age, wealth and education), conditioned on differences in 
experience and importance of non-agricultural activities, as reflecting the cost of 
establishing a link. Hence, as a rule, we would expect negative coefficient estimates on 
these variables reflecting the fact that greater differences between people tend to 
discourage individuals from investing in establishing interpersonal links.  
                                                 
10 Illiterate is defined as never having attended school; literate is its complement.   11
Nonetheless, it is not obvious whether the variables associated with non-
agricultural activities should encourage or discourage information links related to 
agricultural production and marketing.  Can someone with a non-farming occupation 
(say, a teacher) be contacted in order to provide information on some problem related 
with agricultural production? In principle, one would expect the teacher’s direct 
experience would not be especially helpful to a farmer. However, the teacher’s capacity 
to access information that may not be available to a farmer could also be thought valuable 
a priori. A similar argument can be made about the value of farming experience, which 
may be valuable in dealing with commonplace problems, but which may not be so 
valuable in dealing with disequilibria, in which case, formal education (that we included, 
in this context, only as a variable that signals social position) could be more important.
11 
We analyze two further aspects of the structure of these information networks, the 
first suggested by the data itself and the second suggested by the literature on social 
networks. First, we explore the interlinkage between different networks and the effect of 
the existence of an information link between both individuals on some other matter on the 
probability of asking for advice on a different question.  
Table 3 summarizes the possible combinations of answers to the set of 
information link questions asked of each respondent with respect to each randomly 
chosen match individual.  
[TABLE 3] 
The data show that more than 82 percent of the responses are all or nothing, either 
don’t ask the match for advice on any of the problems (58.0 percent) or ask the match for 
                                                 
11 See Barrett et al. (2004) on the importance of education in dealing with disequilibria in west African 
farming systems.   12
advice on all of them (24.2 percent). Let us focus just on the positive answers.  No matter 
the question, more than two-thirds of the positive responses are associated with positive 
responses to each of the other questions as well, signaling interlinkage between different 
networks.   
It is also apparent that although respondents rarely choose to contact a match for 
advice on only one of the three problems related to agricultural production (unhealthy 
crops, fertilizer application and planting technique), they are considerably more likely to 
make a link solely for advice on crop marketing.  Networks interlinkage would appear to 
depend in part on the degree to which the explicit purposes of the links are closely 
related.  
Second, we explore Granovetter’s classic “strength of weak ties” hypothesis, that 
the most valuable connections people have are those that they exercise infrequently.  The 
strength of weak ties hypothesis can be tested using respondents’ answer to the question 
 “In a normal month, how often do you talk with ___?”  
where we take frequency of contact as the measure of the strength of the link. Figure 1 
presents a smoothed frequency distribution of answers to this question, where several 
focal points plainly emerge, around 0 times per month, weekly, semi-weekly, and daily 
contact.  
Figure 2 displays the smoothed frequency distribution of “yes” answers to each 
of the link questions conditional on frequency of contact. The frequency with which 
respondents indicate they would ask for advice from the random match seems to increase 
at a rapidly diminishing rate in frequency of contact. This suggests that the marginal 
effect of a weak tie – as signaled by very infrequent contact (e.g., weekly or less) with the   13
match – on the likelihood of establishing a link is far higher than the marginal effect of 
increased contact with a strong tie.   
 [FIGURE  1] 
 [FIGURE  2] 
3. Econometric estimation 
To explain the decision to establish a link, we estimate the model  
lijk
* = X’β + uij        ( 2 )  
where lijk
* denotes i’s propensity to establish a link with j in order to get access to 
information on problem k, X’is the matrix of explanatory variables described above, β is 
the corresponding parameter vector and uij is a normally distributed error term. We 
cannot observe the latent variable lijk
* but can observe the dichotomous variable lijk 
defined as 
lijk = { 1 if lijk
*>0,  0  otherwise}      (3) 
and that takes the value 1 when the answer to the k
th question is “yes”. We further assume  
E(uij) = 0 , Var (uij)  =  1       (4) 
E(uij, uih) ≠ 0 if  j ≠ h , E (uih, uih) = 0 if i ≠  j    (5) 
E(X,uij) = 0            ( 6 )  
These assumptions imply a probit model estimated by clustering the observations on the 
identity of the respondent and taking the explanatory variables as exogenous. 
Because we don’t have information on all variables for all individuals/matches, 
we must drop approximately one-third of the observations. Nonetheless, a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test of the equality of the distributions for all dependent and independent   14
variables does not support the rejection of the null hypothesis that the distribution of the 
variables for which we have complete information is from the same as the original one.
12 
We start by estimating the determinants of these networks, as revealed by the 
answers to each of the four prospective information link questions stated above. As 
shown in Table 1, the decision to address one’s match is shaped by previous knowledge 
of the match, where a negative answer to “Do you know ___?” determines a negative 
answer to the following questions.  The apparently sequential choice process leads us to 
estimate the determinants of these networks using only the subsample of those who know 
their match (Maddala, 1983, p 124).   
But since the question of who knows whom is of interest in its own right, given 
the commonplace assumption of the village as a natural unit of analysis in much of the 
development literature, we start by addressing it. 
 
a) Who knows whom?   
Table 4, column A presents the results of the probit estimation for the dependent variable 
reflecting knowledge of the random match.
13   
[TABLE 4] 
The model performs remarkably well, correctly predicting individuals’ knowledge of 
their random matches in more than 90 percent of cases. Individuals with greater wealth 
and net business revenue are more likely to know others, although individuals are 
                                                 
12 We repeated this test for subsequent exclusions of observations, namely when we only use the 
observations for which the respondent knows his match, and we could not reject the null hypothesis in any 
case.  
13 Given the large size of these results tables, we skip the usual presentation of the marginal effects of 
explanatory variables. The coefficients measure the impact of changes in the explanatory variables upon the 
latent (unobservable) variable and thus offer meaningful inference on the sign of the effect upon the binary 
variable and allow for comparisons of the relative effect of different explanatory variables.  Detailed results 
on the marginal effects of each explanatory variable are available from the authors on request.   15
significantly more likely to know people wealthier or earning less than themselves, as 
reflected by the coefficient estimates on the wealthier/poorer and 
net_rev_more/net_rev_less. A teacher will more likely be known but was no special 
advantage in knowing other people. Migrants are less likely to know nonmigrants and 
women are less likely to know men. 
One of the striking things about these results is the asymmetric effect of variables 
such as gender, migrant status, wealth, net revenue and occupation.  
Table 4, column B presents the probit estimates of the same equation (2) with 
social distance now measured more traditionally, as the absolute value of the difference, 
rather than using the modification we propose to accommodate potentially asymmetric 
costs and benefits between individuals. Although the number of explanatory variables 
that differ between the two models is relatively small, the results in column A tell a richer 
and more compelling story, as the interpretation of the coefficients associated with the 
wealth and net revenue variables make clear. We can test these alternative approaches 
more formally by defining  
lijk
* = X’ β + Y’ θ + u0    u 0 ~ N(0,1)    (7) 
lijk
* =  Z’ γ + Y’ θ+ u1     u1 ~ N(0,1)   (8) 
where X is the vector of differences as defined in equation (1), Z is the vector of absolute 
values of the differences and Y is the vector of variables that is common to both 
specifications. We test the adequacy of each model by checking their capacity to explain 
over and above what is explained by the alternative specification: let lijk
1 be the predicted 
value of lijk
* from equation (7) and let lijk
2 have an analogous interpretation, from 
equation (8). After estimating the equation   16
lijk
* = αlijk
2 + X’ β + v0   v 0 ~ N(0,1)      (7’) 
we can test whether the set of variables X has any explanatory capacity through a Wald 
test of the null hypothesis that the vector B is statistically equal to zero. The same can be 
done with the model in equation (8) through estimation of the equation 
lijk
* = αlijk
1 + Z’ γ + v1   v1 ~ N(0,1)      (8’) 
and testing for the joint significance of D.  If we can reject the null hypothesis that β is 
statistically equal to zero and cannot reject the null hypothesis that γ is statistically equal 
to zero, then our proposed approach to measuring social distance outperforms the 
standard method in these data. The two models will be statistically equivalent if we 
cannot reject either null hypothesis or if we can reject both. 
When the dependent variable is interpersonal knowledge, there seems to be no 
statistically significant different between the two methods.  The Wald statistics for the 
null hypotheses that D=0 and B=0 equal 2.40, which has a p-value of 0.966 against the 
X
2
8 distribution, and 17.43, which has a p-value of 0.625 against the X
2
20 distribution, 
respectively.  While the interpretation of the asymmetric measures makes more intuitive 
sense and performs slightly better in predicting which matches a respondent will already 
know, those differences are not statistically significant.  As we see in the next section, 
however, the asymmetric social distance measures significantly outperform the more 
standard, symmetric ones when we study the information links people choose to make.      
 
b) Asking for information 
Table 5 summarizes the probit estimates of the decision of approach one’s match in order 
to obtain information in response to the four questions above.    17
[TABLE  6]  
Wald tests of the joint statistical significance of particular sets of variables show 
that one’s attributes are not, as a rule, important to explain information links, as can be 
seen by the values of the associated Wald statistic. This is especially true for those 
problems that as less ordinary (fertilizer application and marketing) and is less true for 
information on planting techniques (where the respondents’ attributes are jointly 
significant at the 15% significance level). The lone exception relates to queries regarding 
unhealthy crops, where own attributes (just) matter at the 5% significance level.  
By contrast, each set of variables that measure the costs and benefits of a link in 
terms of differences between the respondent and his or her match are jointly statistically 
significant, usually at levels of significance below 1%. These two results – that the 
respondent’s own attributes do not matter significantly to establishing a link, but that 
differences between the prospectively linked individuals matter a great deal – suggest that 
relative social position matters most. 
Social distance between the respondent and match provides the strongest 
explanation for the choice to establish an information link, moreso than difference in 
agricultural experience, in non-agricultural activities or in occupations. Co-residence in 
the same household sharply increases the likelihood that one would ask the match. 
Differences in migrant status matter and reasonably symmetrically, with migrants less 
likely to ask nonmigrants and vice versa, with point estimates that are not statistically 
significantly different from one another.  Conditional on knowing each other – which, 
recall from Table 4, is heavily impacted by wealth – people are more likely to ask   18
questions of those who are less wealthy than themselves than of those of equal or greater 
wealth. 
Gender differences matter a lot with respect to agricultural production matters, but 
not with respect to marketing.  Perhaps more interesting, there appear to be strongly 
asymmetric effects of gender differences on individuals’ incentives to establish 
information network links.  Men are very reluctant to ask agricultural production 
questions of women, and women are less likely to ask such questions of each other, albeit 
statistically significantly so only with respect to plant health.  But a woman is more likely 
to ask questions of a man than is another man.  
Differences in experience with pineapple production seem to significantly affect 
respondents’ search for information. Farmers appear significantly more likely to ask 
questions of matches with more experience than they have and less likely to ask questions 
of those with less experience.  The differences are much larger in both magnitude and in 
statistical significance with respect to experience in pineapple, a new crop in the region, 
than in maize, a long-established staple crop.  This sort of pattern is likewise intuitive and 
consistent with basic models of learning. 
Differences in non-agricultural activities and in occupation likewise matter to 
farmers’ propensity to ask questions of their random matches.  Those who work more 
off-farm are considerably more likely to ask questions of those matches they know who 
spend less time off-farm and more time in agriculture than they do.  Conversely, people 
are less likely to ask agricultural production questions of teachers or traders but far more 
likely to ask agricultural marketing questions of teachers.  This suggests that those who 
are regarded as more detached from ordinary farming problems can nonetheless be seen   19
as “bridges” towards solutions to nontraditional problems. This interpretation, which 
hints at the strength of weak ties hypothesis suggested by Granovetter (1973), will be 
tested more formally, using information on the frequency of contact, in section 5. 
As the preceding discussion implies, the asymmetric effects of social distance 
appear significant in understanding the endogenous formation of information networks in 
rural Ghana.  We establish this more formally following the statistical approach 
enumerated earlier, based on estimating equations (7’) and (8’) and then testing the 
exclusionary restrictions on the unique components of each regression.
14 Table 6 displays 
the results of these tests. The asymmetric social distance measure dramatically 
outperforms the symmetric measure based on simple Euclidean distance in each of the 
three models related to agricultural production information.  Although the asymmetric 
treatment performs modestly better with respect to agricultural marketing information as 
well, there is no statistically significant difference between the two social distance 
measures with respect to that dependent variable. 
[TABLE 6] 
The differences in determinants of network linkages between information related 
to agricultural production and to agricultural marketing (Tables 3, 6 and 7) raise the 
question of the degree to which information networks interlink.  Are people more likely 
to ask a question of a randomly matched individual the more likely they are to ask a 
different question of that same individual?  Or do people target questions differentially at 
distinct individuals, building different networks with relatively limited 
interconnectedness?  We turn now to explore this question. 
                                                 
14 To conserve space, we omit the estimation results of the models that use the Euclidean norm measure of 
distance. They are available upon request.   20
4. Interlinked networks 
As mentioned above, the similarities between the three different agricultural production-
related information networks are quite striking. We test for their interlinkage by re-
estimating the above models, now also including as explanatory variables the fitted 
values of the probability of establishing a link in the remaining models. That is, we 
estimate the system of equations 
lij-k
* = X’ β + u0     u0 ~  N(0,1)    (9) 
lijk
* = lij-k~µ+ X’ β* + u1    u 1 ~  N(0,1)    (10) 
where lij-k
* is i’s propensity to address j in order to get information to solve any of the  
problems other than the k
th problem, while lij-k~ is defined as  
lij-k~ = prob (lij-k
*> 0 )       ( 1 1 )  
The estimated coefficients on the fitted lij-k regressor are presented in Table 7, together 
with the value of the Wald statistic of the test of the joint null hypothesis that all other 
variables (those enumerated in Table 5) equal zero.  
[TABLE 7] 
We can define these networks as interlinked when our estimates from equation (10) 
permit us to reject the hypothesis that the µ parameter relating lijk
* to lij-k
* equals zero 
while at the same time failing to reject the null hypothesis that β * = 0, i.e., that other 
network linkages fully explain an individual’s likelihood of establishing an information 
link to a randomly matched person.    21
Given this definition, we can only conclude that the decision to ask for advice on 
fertilizer application is not interlinked with other decisions to establish an information 
network.  As for the other prospective information topics, we either cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the other network linkages do not add to our understanding of links 
regarding questions of unhealthy crops or planting technique or we can reject the null 
hypothesis that once one controls for the other network links, the remaining covariates 
have no statistically significant relation to the likelihood of asking about agricultural 
marketing. 
15  
Nonetheless, since there is no reason to expect that differences in identity would 
impose costs of establishing a link that would differ with the problem about which a 
respondent might inquire of his or her match, this result strikes us as further evidence of 
the asymmetric benefits of establishing an information link in one’s network, with the 
asymmetry in this case arising from relatively modest differences in the nature of the 
information sought.  
 
5. Strength of ties 
The evidence in Figures 1 and 2 and Table 5 raises the intriguing possibility that 
Granovetter’s classic “strength of weak ties” hypothesis might find support in these data. 
In formulating our hypothesis, we follow the original intuition of the author (Granovetter, 
1973): “A natural a priori idea is that those with whom one has strong ties are more 
motivated to help with job information. Opposed to this greater motivation are the 
structural arguments I have been making: those to whom we are weakly tied are more 
                                                 
15 The nonlinearity of the first stage estimate of lij-k~ obviates the collinearity problem that would 
otherwise exist, permitting identification of d.   22
likely to move in circles different from our own and will thus have access to information 
different from that which we receive”.  
Of course, it is not exactly clear how one ought to measure the strength of a tie.  
In the original exposition of this hypothesis, Granovetter (1973) writes that “most 
intuitive notions of the “strength” of an interpersonal tie should be satisfied by the 
following definition: the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount 
of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal 
services which characterize the tie.” In an early review of studies that tried to test this 
hypothesis, Granovetter (1982) identifies two major ways of operationalizing the concept 
of “strength of tie”: (i) frequency of contact, as we use here and as did Granovetter 
(1973), and (ii) the assumption that ties with different people (e.g., kin, friends, 
colleagues and acquaintances) had inherently different strength, something that is not 
directly measurable in these data.  
Instead of assuming that the probability of establishing a link is a monotonically 
decreasing function of frequency of contact, we posit that such relation may be non–
linear.  As is plain from Table 1, people need to already know someone in order for them 
to feel comfortable approaching them for information or advice.  So there is plainly a 
sharp increase in the likelihood of establishing a link as one makes initial contact. The 
salient question is how much additional contact increases people’s propensity to establish 
informational links.  Up to some point, more frequent contact may permit better 
evaluation of the costs and benefits of the link (e.g., the likely accuracy of the 
information obtained and the motivation level of the match to respond to a request for   23
assistance), after which point high frequency interaction may signal that little new or 
relevant information can be transmitted by the potential contact.  
In order to test the “strength of weak ties” hypothesis we therefore estimate the 
following system of equations: 
 z ij = X’  δ+ vij          vij ~ N(0, σ
2)      (14) 
 l ijk
* = α z + λ z
2 + X’ β + uij   u ij ~ N(0, 1)      (15) 
where zij is frequency of contact between i and j, X is the same vector of explanatory 
variables as before, and z and z
2 are, respectively, the predicted value of frequency of talk 
and its square, obtained by estimating equation (14).
16  
In order to obtain the fitted values of frequency of talk, we regressed this variable 
on the same variables as in the previous models, but using only a subsample of the 
original data.  In particular we excluded those observations with a abnormally high 
number of “average number of talks in a normal month”.
17 The results are presented in 
Table 8. 
[TABLE 8] 
                                                 
16 Notice that the parameter α is identified by the statistical significance of the variable “teacher” in Table 8 
(where we explain the number of talks in an average month) and its absence in Table 6 (where we explain 
the decisions of establishing a link for any of the four problems under analysis). Although this is a rather 
ad-hoc process, motivated by the lack of instruments that can, reasonably, separate the frequency of contact 
from the propensity to ask for advice, it is supported by our general result that own attributes seem not to 
matter in the models presented in Table 6. The re-estimation of these last models after the exclusion of 
other attributes (such as “cocoa” or  “cassava”), in order to increase the precision of the estimates, produced 
the same results. 
17 We excluded those observations where the frequency of contact in an average month was in the range 60-
300 times; this represents less than 2% of the total number of observations. As above, we performed a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of the distributions of all dependent and independent variables and 
failed to reject the null hypothesis that these distributions were identical.    24
As one would expect, the frequency with which the respondent and his or her random 
match speak is sharply increasing if they reside in the same household.  Men speak to 
each other more frequently than do women with either men or women.  Teachers and 
traders speak with people more frequently than do people in other occupations.  And, in 
general, the frequency of contact decreases with social distance along any of several 
dimensions: wealth, income, occupation, etc. 
Table 9 summarizes the coefficient estimates associated with the variables z and 
z
2.  These estimates indicate precisely the hypothesized strong concave relation between 
frequency of contact and likelihood of establishing a link.  The last row in Table 9 
presents the estimated number of talks per month that maximizes the probability of 
contacting one’s match.  The estimated marginal effect is shown in Figure 3 for the case 
of asking about fertilizer application.  The marginal effects for the other three questions 
look very similar. 
 [TABLE 9] 
[FIGURE 3] 
In the case of traditional agricultural production questions (concerning planting 
techniques and plant health), about which farmers have less to learn, the frequency of 
contact that maximizes the likelihood that someone asks a question of a match is almost 
25% larger than in those cases where new or more extraordinary information is sought d 
(regarding fertilizer application and finding a buyer).  This is consistent with the 
sociological observation that heterophilous relations – contacts with people less like 
oneself, which occur less frequently – are especially valuable in addressing novel 
situations. Farmers trade off social proximity for access to new information as most   25
appropriate to the question at hand.  In all cases, however, the greatest marginal effect on 
the likelihood of making the information network link occurs at very low frequency of 
contact.  Weak ties indeed seem to have strong effects. 
6. Conclusions 
The structure of one’s social networks has been increasingly recognized as a crucial 
determinant of access to information, credit and, more generally, influence.  Although 
social networks’ role in shaping decisions and outcomes seems important, quantification 
of this effect has proved relatively elusive, not least of which because analysts have 
typically been unable to control adequately for the obvious endogeneity of networks.  
This paper argues for the need to treat social networks as endogenous and for the 
importance of recognizing the asymmetries that underlie the concept of social distance as 
it relates to the establishment of information network linkages. We propose and test a 
new measure of social distance that accommodates possible asymmetries in social 
distance and find that, for most of the problems analyzed in this paper, this new measure 
outperforms the Euclidean norm most commonly used in the extant literature. 
Using this improved measure of social distance, we stress the need to consider 
explicitly the cost-benefit calculus in which agents engage when deciding whether or not 
to link to another individual.  Networks are not exogenously determined on the basis of 
inherited identity; they are a direct product of individual choice, albeit choice that is 
conditioned by social distance that is predetermined (e.g., with respect to occupation) or 
exogenous (e.g., with respect to gender).  Our results show that social distance plays a 
major role indeed in shaping network structure, but that other factors related to the 
inherent costs and benefits of linkage matter significantly as well.    26
Reinforcing this point, we find that in spite of the evident similarities in the 
structure of the four networks we study and although social distance is exactly the same 
between each respondent and his or her random matches in each prospective network, 
there are statistically and economically significant differences between these networks.  
The costs of establishing a link with respect to social distance should be the same 
whatever the problem, yet the benefits will vary across the question at hand.  Thus, for 
example, people more actively seek out particular types of individuals – teachers, traders, 
those with whom they have less frequent contact – when faced with nontraditional 
questions than with problems with which they have much prior experience themselves. 
We interpret these differences as evidence that cross-sectional variation in the benefits of 
links affect agents’ behavior in constructing and maintaining information networks.  This 
point is further reinforced by our empirical corroboration of the sociological “strength of 
weak ties” hypothesis, that there exists inverted-U effect of frequency of contact upon the 
decision to form a network link, with the greatest marginal effects occurring at the lowest 
frequencies of interpersonal contact.   
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Figure 2 – frequency of “yes” as a function of average number of talks in a normal month   30
   
Figure 3: marginal effect of the number of talks per month on establishing a link in order 
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Table 1: Prospective information links conditional on prior knowledge of match 
 
  Can you go to ___  
  
If you had a problem 
with unhealthy 
crops? 
for advice about 
when to apply a new 
kind of fertilizer? 
if you wanted to 
discuss changing 
your method of 
planting? 
if you wanted to find 
a buyer for any of 
your crops? 
Know  no yes  no yes no yes no yes
no  312 1 312 1 312 1 313 0
yes  1755 959  1819 895 1834 880 1852 862
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Table 2: Explanatory variables 
Variable  Definition  (i = respondent, j = randomly matched individual)  Mean 
(Std Deviation) 








Both_migrant  0-1 dummy variable that equals 1 if both i and j are migrants  .001 
(.033) 
Migrant_nmigrant  0-1 dummy variable that equals 1 if only i is migrant  .044 
(.204) 
Nmigrant_nmigrant  0-1 dummy variable that equals 1 if both i and  j are not migrant  .914 
(.280) 
Ff  0-1 dummy variable that equals 1 if both i and j are female  .260 
(.438) 
Fm  0-1 dummy variable that equals 1 if i is female and j is male  .292 
(.455) 
Mf  0-1 dummy variable that equals 1 if i is male and j is female  .207 
(.405) 
Older  Age difference between i and j if i is older than j, 0 otherwise  6.95 
(10.68) 
Younger  Absolute value of age difference between i and j if i is younger 
than j, 0 otherwise 
7.23 
(10.75) 
Literacy  0-1 dummy variable that equals 1 if i is illiterate and j is literate  .167 
(.373) 
Wealthier  Difference in wealth between i and j (in 10
5 cedis) if i is wealthier 
than j, 0 otherwise 
2.56 
(11.76) 
Poorer  Absolute value of the difference in wealth between i and j (in 10
5 
cedis) if i is poorer than j, 0 otherwise 
2.83 
(9.03) 
Maize_more  Difference in experience with maize (in years) between i and j if i 
has more experience than j, 0 otherwise 
6.57 
(10.38) 
Maize_less  Absolute value of the difference in experience with maize (in 
years) between i and j if i has less experience than j, 0 otherwise 
7.56 
(10.81) 
Cassava_more  The same as Maize_more, for cassava  6.60 
(10.43) 
Cassava_less  The same as Maize_less for cassava  7.61 
(10.94) 
Pineapple_more  The same as Maize_more, for pineapple  1.31 
(2.95) 
Pineapple_less  The same as Maize_less for pineapple  2.47 
(4.37) 
Cocoa_more  The same as Maize_more, for cocoa  2.93 
(8.34) 
Cocoa_less  The same as Maize_less for cocoa  2.68 
(7.27) 
Yam_more  The same as Maize_more, for yam  5.19 
(10.26) 
Yam_less  The same as Maize_less for yam  6.20 
(12.07) 
Wage_more  Difference in wage received between i and j if i has received more 
wage than j, 0 otherwise 
28631.32 
(115113.4) 
Wage_less  Absolute value of the difference in wage received between i and j 
if i has received less wage than j, 0 otherwise 
23208.75 
(95119.840 
Time_job_more  Difference in time spent on non-farm job between i and j if i spent 
more time than j, 0 otherwise 
.088 
(.242) 
Time_job_less  Absolute value of the difference in time spent on non-farm job 
between iand j if i spent less time than j, 0 otherwise 
.075 
(.221)   33
Net_rev_more  Difference in net revenue from own business between i and j if i 
received a bigger net revenue than j, 0 otherwise 
43600.24 
(144527.4) 
Net_rev_less  Absolute value of the difference in net revenue from own business 




Time_bus_more  Difference in time spent on own business between i and j if i spent 
more time than j, 0 otherwise 
.186 
(.417) 
Time_bus_less  Absolute value of the difference in time spent on own business 
between i and j if i spent less time than j, 0 otherwise 
.177 
(.405) 




Farm_nfarm  0-1 variable that equals 1 if only  i identifies himself as farmer  .110 
(.313) 
Nfarm_farm  0-1 variable that equals 1 if only  j identifies himself as farmer  .122 
(.327) 




Teacher_nteacher  0-1 variable that equals 1 if only  i identifies himself as teacher  .021 
(.145) 
Nteacher_teacher  0-1 variable that equals 1 if only  j identifies himself as teacher  .016 
(.126) 




Trad_ntrad  0-1 variable that equals 1 if only  i identifies himself as trader  .129 
(.335) 
Ntrad_trad  0-1 variable that equals 1 if only  j identifies himself as trader  .133 
(.339) 
Male  0-1 variable that equals 1 if i is male  .447 
(.497) 
Age  Age of i  40.02 
(13.44) 
Wealth  Value of non-land assets owned by i (in 10
5 cedis)  3.29 
(12.16) 
Maize  Years of experience with maize of individual i  24.21 
(14.04) 
Cassava  Years of experience with cassava of individual i  24.14 
(14.11) 
Pineapple  Years of experience with pineapple of individual i  2.06 
(3.53) 
Cocoa  Years of experience with cocoa of individual i  3.37 
(8.76) 
Yam  Years of experience with yam of individual i  9.22 
(12.95) 
Wage  Value of wage received by i  30728 
(117224) 
Time_job  Time spent on job by i  .096 
(.254) 
Net_rev  Value of net revenue from own business received by i  35481 
(153573) 
Time_bus  Time spent on own business by i  .229 
(.456) 
Farmer  0-1 variable that equals 1 if i identifies himself as farmer  .839 
(.367) 
Teacher   0-1 variable that equals 1 if i identifies himself as teacher  .022 
(.148) 
Trader  0-1 variable that equals 1 if i identifies himself as trader  .167 
(.373)   34
Village 1  0-1 variable that equals 1 if i lives in village 1  .27 
(.44) 
Village 2  0-1 variable that equals 1 if i lives in village 2  .20 
(40) 
Village 3  0-1 variable that equals 1 if i lives in village 3  .30 
(.46) 
Abs_male  0-1 variable that equals 1 if I and j have the same gender  .49 
(.50) 
Abs_age  Absolute value of the difference in age between i and j  14.13 
(11.33) 





Abs_maize  Absolute value of the difference in years of experience with maize 
between i and j 
14.78 
(11.96) 
Abs_pineapple  Absolute value of the difference in years of experience with 
pineapple between i and j 
3.78 
(4.58) 
Abs_cocoa  Absolute value of the difference in years of experience with cocoa 
between i and j 
5.43 
(9.99) 
Abs_yam  Absolute value of the difference in years of experience with yam 
between i and j 
11.40 
(13.78) 
Abs_wage  Absolute value of the difference in earnings from non-farm job 




Abs_time_job  Absolute value of the difference in time spent on non-farm job 
between i and j 
.17 
(31) 
Abs_net_rev  Absolute value of the difference in earnings from own business 




Abs_net_rev  Absolute value of the difference in time spent in own business 
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Table 3: Network interlinkages 
  
Percentage of "yes" responses, per 
problem and per combination of answers 
   Number 
unhealthy 
crops fertilizer  planting  buyer 
don't ask for advice 
on any problem  1575         
ask for advice only 
for unhealthy crops  48 5 0 0 0
ask for advice only 
for fertilizer 
application 33  0 3.7 0 0
ask for advice only 
for changes in 
planting technique   1  0 0 0.1 0
ask for advice only 
for getting a buyer  111 0 0 0 12.9
ask for advice on all 
but getting a buyer  139 14.5 15.5 15.8 0
ask for advice on all 
problems 658  68.5 73.4 74.7 76.3
other combinations   149  12.0 7.4 9.4 10.8
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Table 4: Probit Estimation Results of Likelihood of Knowing the Random Match 
  Robust       Robust    
A Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>|z|  B  Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>|z| 
same_clan  0.244  0.114 0.032  same_clan  0.219  0.108 0.043 
both_migrant  -1.186  1.036 0.252  both_migrant  -1.039  0.876 0.235 
migrant_nmigrant  -0.570  0.218 0.009  migrant_nmigrant  -0.608  0.202 0.003 
nmigrant_migrant  -0.095  0.235 0.686  nmigrant_migrant  -0.108  0.228 0.637 
ff -0.135  0.159  0.396 
fm  -0.438  0.158 0.006 
mf -0.101  0.164  0.538 
abs_male  -0.285  0.088 0.001 
older  -0.020  0.009 0.030 
younger 0.001  0.007  0.832 
abs_age -0.007  0.005  0.138 
literacy  0.090  0.135 0.505  literacy  0.061  0.135 0.648 
wealthier  -0.130  0.058 0.025 
poorer  0.052  0.021 0.014 
abs_wealth  0.037  0.012 0.002 
maize_more -0.009  0.009  0.319 
maize_less -0.001  0.007  0.930 
abs_maize -0.006  0.005  0.203 
pineapple_more -0.076  0.056  0.172 
pineapple_less  0.031  0.017 0.062 
abs_pineapple  0.033  0.014 0.018 
cocoa_more -0.008  0.020  0.681 
cocoa_less 0.011  0.008  0.193 
abs_cocoa 0.011  0.007  0.107 
yam_more 0.007  0.010  0.457 
yam_less 0.003  0.006  0.591 
abs_yam  0.008  0.005 0.073 
wage_more -1.060  0.754  0.159 
wage_less 0.079  0.063  0.208 
abs_wage 0.084  0.056  0.131 
time_job_more 1.291  1.557  0.407 
time_job_less -0.305  0.233  0.189 
abs_time_job  -0.490  0.211 0.020 
time_bus_more  -0.647  0.392 0.099 
time_bus_less -0.039  0.123  0.753 
abs_time_bus 0.046  0.117  0.691 
net_rev_more  -0.145  0.069 0.035 
net_rev_less  0.151  0.042 0.000 
abs_net_rev  0.077  0.034 0.022 
both_farmer  -0.081  0.256 0.753  both_farmer  -0.009  0.255 0.972 
farm_nfarm  -0.394  0.262 0.133  farm_nfarm  -0.330  0.258 0.202 
nfarm_farm  -0.259  0.253 0.304  nfarm_farm  -0.161  0.252 0.523 
teacher_nteacher 0.227  0.252 0.368  teacher_nteacher 0.292  0.249 0.241 
nteacher_teacher  1.272  0.328 0.000  nteacher_teacher  1.114  0.324 0.001 
both_trader  -0.252  0.221 0.255  trad_ntrad  0.237  0.209 0.257 
ntrad_trad -0.203  0.145  0.164  ntrad_trad  -0.324  0.136 0.017 
male         male  0.294  0.120 0.015 
age -0.006  0.009  0.454  age  -0.017  0.006 0.003 
wealth  0.124  0.058 0.031  wealth  -0.039  0.012 0.001 
maize  0.061  0.028 0.027  maize  0.054  0.026 0.038 
cassava  -0.040  0.027 0.136  cassava  -0.037  0.026 0.144 
pineapple  0.081  0.051 0.111  pineapple  -0.007  0.016 0.674 
cocoa  0.004  0.020 0.860  cocoa  -0.015  0.009 0.112 
yam -0.013  0.010  0.185  yam  -0.010  0.006 0.075 
wage  1.080  0.755 0.151  wage  -0.081  0.094 0.390 
time_job  -1.422  1.555 0.360  time_job  0.420  0.373 0.260   37
net_rev  0.209  0.073 0.004  net_rev  0.049  0.065 0.447 
time_bus  0.623  0.380 0.101  time_bus  -0.019  0.123 0.878 
trader -0.192  0.160  0.230  trader  -0.434  0.201 0.031 
village1  -0.428  0.165 0.010  village1  -0.468  0.154 0.002 
village2 -0.185  0.187  0.323  village2  -0.296  0.169 0.079 
village3  0.378  0.212 0.074  village3  0.397  0.178 0.026 
constant  1.541  0.439 0.000  constant  1.926  0.361 0.000 
number of observations  2173     2173 
percent correctly predicted  91.1     90.9 
Log likelihood  -507.779     -535.582 
Pseudo R-squared  0.2288     0.1866 
 
In both specifications, the variables “Same_hh” and “Both_teacher” predict success perfectly 
when equal to 1; these variables were dropped and 25 observations were not used. Also, the 
variables “trad_ntrad”, “farmer” and “teacher” were dropped due to collinearity. In the 
specification presented in column A, “male” is dropped due to collinearity. 
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Table 5: Probit Estimation Results of Likelihood of Establishing a Link 
    









same_hh  1.767 1.689  1.951  2.677 
  0.357 0.272  0.368  0.390 
same_clan 0.117  0.102  0.117  0.079 
  0.077 0.078  0.078  0.083 
migrant_nmigrant -0.575  -0.710 -0.713 -0.956 
  0.391 0.402  0.425  0.485 
nmigrant_migrant  -0.469 -0.471  -0.446  -0.203 
  0.180 0.197  0.193  0.182 
ff  -0.315  -0.199 -0.226 0.254 
  0.159 0.157  0.163  0.162 
fm 0.132  0.417 0.286 0.142 
  0.149 0.144  0.151  0.152 
mf  -0.782 -0.936  -0.870  -0.166 
  0.136 0.187  0.163  0.128 
wealthier  0.048 0.043  0.042  -0.006 
  0.022 0.022  0.022  0.020 

















   0.003 0.003  0.003  0.003 
maize_more -0.008  0.000  -0.009  -0.012 
  0.006 0.007  0.007  0.007 
maize_less -0.005  -0.005  -0.004  -0.003 
  0.006 0.006  0.006  0.006 
pineapple_more  -0.049 -0.092  -0.054  -0.076 
  0.025 0.025  0.024  0.026 








































   0.008 0.009  0.008  0.008 
wage_more -0.549  -0.769  -0.812  -0.589 
  0.482 0.483  0.489  0.597 
wage_less -0.026  -0.066  -0.027  -0.026 
  0.044 0.043  0.043  0.043 
time_job_more  2.122 2.449  2.307  3.086 
  1.200 1.252  1.256  1.761 
time_job_less -0.223  -0.212  -0.243  -0.156 
  0.200 0.199  0.204  0.189 
time_bus_more -0.220  -0.312  -0.433  0.019 
  0.207 0.236  0.232  0.222 
time_bus_less -0.059  -0.103  -0.099  -0.010 
  0.095 0.108  0.100  0.093 
net_rev_more 0.060  0.089  0.050  0.029 
  0.066 0.069  0.071  0.069 












































   0.025 0.026  0.025  0.025 
nteacher_teacher  -0.875 -0.864  -0.838  0.921 
  0.345 0.347  0.351  0.265 



























  0.202 0.182  0.205  0.213   39
ntrad_trad  -0.219  -0.191 -0.151 -0.095   
   0.131 0.130  0.128  0.128 
age -0.001  0.000  -0.004  -0.005 
  0.009 0.009  0.009  0.009 
wealth  -0.055 -0.049  -0.050  -0.002 
  0.022 0.022  0.022  0.020 
maize 0.015  0.010  0.023 0.022 
  0.012 0.012  0.012  0.012 
yam  -0.020  -0.011  -0.014  -0.003 
  0.008 0.007  0.007  0.008 
time_job -1.709  -2.122 -2.124 -2.650 
  1.220 1.254  1.287  1.720 
time_bus 0.312  0.309  0.497  0.140 
  0.229 0.249  0.248  0.225 
















  0.244 0.231  0.250  0.241 
number of observations  1997  1997  1997  1997 
percent correctly predicted  67.1  70.6  67.4  68.9 
Log-likelihood value  -1095.8  -1002.3  -1049.8  -1042.7 
Pseudo R-squared  0.17  0.23  0.19  0.19 
Wald statistics         
Social distance:                     W   86.79  115.58  92.09  68.13 
                        (n. df) 









Difference experience:          W  17.67  47.09  21.18  19.94 
                        (n. df) 









Diff. non-agric activities:      W  22.79  26.20  18.87  20.14 
                        (n. df) 









Difference occupation:         W  16.15  15.41  12.97  16.09 
                        (n. df) 









Own attributes:                     W  20.18  8.87  16.77  9.67 
                        (n. df) 










Notes: The values in this table are the coefficients estimates  of the probit model and (in 
smaller type) the respective standard deviations. Check table 2 for the definition of these 
variables. 
The variables “both_migrant” and “both_teacher” predict failure perfectly, when equal to 1 
- these variables were dropped and 5 observations were not used.  
The variables “both_trader”, “teacher_nteacher” and “farmer” were dropped due to 
collinearity. For the same reason the variables that express differences in experience in 
cassava were dropped. 
Variables included in the regression but not reported in this table are: constant, village 
dummies, older, younger, literacy, cocoa_more, cocoa_less, yam_more, yam_less, 
both_farmer, farm_nfarm, nfarm_farm, pineapple, cocoa, cassava, net_rev, wage and 
teacher. 
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Table 6: Comparing different measures of social distance 
 
Problem  Difference 
variables  
expressed as:  Unhealthy crops 
Fertilizer 
application  Planting technique Getting a buyer 
W = 0.21 ~ X
2
8  W = 0.81 ~ X
2
8   W = 0.47 ~ X
2
8   W = 0.22 ~ X
2
9  1) Euclidean 
norm 
  prob>X
2 = 1.00  prob>X
2 = 0.99  prob>X
2 = 0.99  prob>X
2 = 1.00 
W = 58.96 ~ X
2
18 W = 75.36 ~ X
2
17 W = 61.89 ~ X
2
17 W = 6.05 ~ X
2
18   2) Double 
indicator 
  prob>X
2 = 0.00  prob>X
2 = 0.00  prob>X
2 = 0.00  prob>X























Table 7: testing for interlinkage between different networks 
 
Problem 
  Unhealthy crops  Fertilizer 
application  Planting technique Getting a buyer 
δ(eq. 10)   1.607  1.683  2.248  1.934 
    (1.554)  (1.792)  (1.482)  (1.001) 
  [0.301] [0.348] [0.129]  [0.053] 
Wald statistic  W = 41.61 ~ X
2
36 W = 55.90 ~ X
2
38 W = 35.85 ~ X
2
37 W = 113.38 ~ X
2
38
   prob>X
2 = 0.24  prob>X
2 = 0.03  prob>X
2 = 0.52  prob>X
2 = 0.00 
Values in parenthesis are standard deviations; values in square backets are p-values. 
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Table 8 : Explaining “Number of talks in an average month” 
     Robust    
   Coef.  Std. Err.  P>|t| 
same_hh  18.261  3.529 0.000 
same_clan 0.222  0.533  0.677 
both_migrant -3.339  3.241  0.304 
migrant_nmigrant 0.141  2.108  0.947 
nmigrant_migrant  -3.059  0.820 0.000 
ff  -2.336  0.916 0.011 
fm  -3.181  0.918 0.001 
mf  -1.605  0.704 0.023 
older -0.049  0.042  0.243 
younger -0.020  0.031  0.515 
literacy  -1.401  0.744 0.061 
wealthier -0.122  0.144  0.399 
poorer  -0.046  0.014 0.001 
maize_more 0.001  0.041  0.982 
maize_less -0.004  0.037  0.919 
pineapple_more -0.247  0.159  0.122 
pineapple_less 0.057  0.057  0.317 
cocoa_more  0.170  0.063 0.007 
cocoa_less 0.028  0.029  0.338 
yam_more -0.062  0.051  0.219 
yam_less 0.030  0.027  0.261 
time_job_more 11.077  8.936 0.216 
time_job_less 2.186  1.409  0.122 
time_bus_more 0.539 1.346 0.689 
time_bus_less  1.000  0.593 0.093 
both_farmer 0.072  1.149  0.950 
farm_nfarm -0.481  1.364  0.725 
nfarm_farm 0.519  1.249  0.678 
teacher_nteacher  -20.583  7.030 0.004 
nteacher_teacher  -3.304  0.960 0.001 
both_trader 0.049  1.215  0.968 
ntrad_trad -0.283  0.701  0.686 
age 0.036  0.044  0.418 
wealth 0.095  0.143  0.507 
maize  1.219  0.080 0.000 
pineapple 0.200  0.149  0.182 
cassava  -1.226  -0.067 0.000 
cocoa  -0.176  0.065 0.008 
yam 0.060  0.050  0.231 
teacher  16.535  6.734 0.015 
trader  1.542  0.797 0.054 
Number of obs =    1956  R-squared     =  0.1305 
F( 52,   330) =  294.43  Prob > F      =  0.0000 
The variables “farmer”, “trad_ntrad” and “both_teacher” 
were dropped due to collinearity. Included in the regression 
but omitted from this table: “wage_more”, “wage_less”, 
“net_rev_more”, “net_rev_less”, “wage”, time_job”, 
“net_rev”,”time_bus”, village dummies and constant.   42
Table 9 : Probit estimates of the effect of strength of a tie on the Likelihood of 
establishing an information link 
 
Problem 
   Parameter  Unhealthy crops  Fertilizer application  Planting technique  Getting a buyer 
αa   (eq. 15)  0.341  0.385  0.457  0.581 
   (0.114)  (0.109)  (0.132)  (0.128) 
   [0.003]  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.000] 
   λ b    (eq.15)  -0.0085  -0.0102  -0.0120  -0.0147 
   (0.0037)  (0.0037)  (0.0043)  (0.0041) 
   [0.025]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.000] 
Number of talks  










Values in parenthesis are standard errors; values in square brackets are p-values 
 